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Introduction
In July 1378, a contingent of lesser guildsmen and lower-class citizens overthrew a
Florentine republican government comprising almost exclusively upper-class citizens, replacing
it with one nominally centered on popular interests. Shortly thereafter, lower-class laborers of the
newly created wool carders’ and combers’ guild, better known as the Ciompi, rebelled against
this government. Allied with the remaining guilds, the government subsequently defeated the
woolworkers and put down what would later become known as the Ciompi Revolt.
Disenfranchised by a government of Florence’s wealthiest and most well-educated men who
were insensitive to the condition of what they frequently perceived as a “mob,” the Ciompi
represent the working class of Renaissance Italy’s urban-based republics. Compelled by the
economic realities of their time and desirous of obtaining greater influence in an increasingly
exclusive government, they resorted to violence in an expression of discontent with poverty and
political impotence. This paper explores the interplay among these forces, namely the economic
effects of the Black Death and the political and societal discord of late-fourteenth century
Florence, and examines their role in generating social unrest in the city during this period.
Primary sources relevant to this project include various chronicles written by Florentines
in the late-fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. First among these is a document contemporary with
the Ciompi Revolt: the Cronaca Prima d’Anonimo (First Chronicle of an Anonymous
Individual) compiled along with the same individual’s second and third chronicles into Gino
Scaramella’s 1934 monograph Il Tumulto dei Ciompi (The Tumult/Revolt of the Ciompi).
Having been unable to locate an English translation for such a specific source, I am analyzing
this document in its original 14 th century Florentine dialect with significant assistance from
Richard Trexler’s The Workers of Renaissance Florence: Power and Dependence in
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Renaissance Florence, Volume III.1 Trexler’s work serves as an accompanying secondary source
by providing a full analysis of both the rebellious workers and the document itself while also
speculating on the latter’s purpose and authorship. While the author of the Cronaca Prima
frequently takes a supportive stance toward the Ciompi, the History of the Florentine People by
Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni offers a much more critical view. Writing approximately
half a century after the revolt (which occurred during his childhood), Bruni displays a standard
elite antipathy toward the lower-class individuals whom he perceives as the cause of the city’s
instability. One must consider, though, that Bruni’s narrative style, modeled heavily on that of
the Roman historian Livy’s History of Rome, seeks to reflect an image of Florence as the Rome
of his time. His chronicle thus carries with it both the implications and vocabulary (he
consistently refers to the upper and lower-classes as “optimates” and “plebs”) of Roman social
conflicts, a rhetorical style which undoubtedly impacted his analysis. Niccolò Machiavelli, an
author more temporally detached from the period than Bruni or the anonymous chronicler, also
discusses the Ciompi Revolt in his Florentine Histories. Written in the 1520s, his account
provides a post-Medici view of the revolt not found in Bruni’s chronicle and can therefore
supply the greater context needed to understand the revolt’s significance.
Since quantitative data from fourteenth-century Florence are relatively scarce, (at least
partially because the revolutionaries of 1378 burned government documents), data from the
much more resource-rich fifteenth century will be used in substitution. In their investigations of
the Ciompi and Florence’s broader economic history, scholars have employed numerous
fifteenth-century primary documents from the Florentine State Archives, especially the records
from the Catasto of 1427, a complete registry of Tuscan households, their annual taxes,
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individuals’ occupations, and more during that year. Without the physical and linguistic ability to
access many of these resources, I find myself relying more heavily on other scholars’
interpretations of these numerical data. Specifically, Raymond de Roover’s The Rise and Fall of
the Medici Bank2 and David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber’s Tuscans and their
Families3, the latter of which provides the results of a computerized, quantitative analysis of
many of these archival documents, have proved invaluable in understanding the socioeconomic
world of Renaissance Florence. I have obtained online access to a partial, English translation of
the Catasto, which provides numerous examples of individuals whose socioeconomic status
might have led them to revolt. More precisely, the names and occupations of those who led the
revolts can be found in both the Cronaca Prima and Trexler’s accompanying work, affording me
the opportunity to locate individuals of the same occupation in the online Catasto and analyze
their individual economic situations.

The Black Death in Fourteenth Century Europe
General information regarding the plague, as well as Florentine politics and society of the
period, will aid in establishing the greater context. Scholars and scientists remain conflicted as to
what specific disease caused the plague; many, however, believe the plague consisted of more
than one disease, with the deadly pneumonic plague, which caused heavy blood loss via the nose
and throat, frequently following the more famous bubonic plague, so-called for its causing of
black bubos on the skin. Death usually followed within a few days, if not on the day on which
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symptoms appeared.4 The plague’s dissemination across Europe is traditionally attributed to the
increased population of diseased-flea-carrying rats, whom the Mongols initially picked up during
their campaigns in Southeast Asia. But these rats were more mobile than most, having the
advantage of a politically stable and united trade route across the Silk Road, thanks to the
Mongols’ conquest of much of East Asia and the Middle East by the early 14th century. Reaching
the Black and Mediterranean Seas, the rats and their fleas were transported by ship in 1347-48 to
Western Europe’s major port cities such as Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Marseilles, from which they
spread inland. As the human population in Europe reached a peak in the early 14 th century, so
did the rat population which scavenged its refuse, accelerating the rate at which the diseased
fleas could spread. It is worth mentioning, however, that primary sources make no mention of
rats or what should have been a large die-off of their species had they been infected, though this
is probably the result of contemporary observers’ inability to understand the science of
pathogens and how they spread.5
In total, the plague is estimated to have killed anywhere from one-fourth to two-thirds of
Europe’s population, with data varying and certain geographic areas receiving harsher blows
than others. Psychologically distraught chroniclers sometimes gave estimates upwards of a 90%
mortality rate, with one London writer stating that only one in fourteen survived the epidemic in
his city. 6 Elsewhere the evidence varies, though urban areas tended to sustain slightly higher
casualty rates than the surrounding countryside. Three Italian cities (Orvieto, Siena, and
Volterra) recorded a 50% population loss, while Hamburg (Germany), Barcelona (Spain), and
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Perpignan (France) each suffered around a 60-70% loss. 7 A particularly high rate of fatality
occurred in Tuscany, the region encompassing Florence, where 60-80% of inhabitants are
estimated to have died. 8 At the dawn of the fourteenth century, Florence was a medieval
metropolis of approximately 100-120,000 inhabitants, but the plague years of 1348-52 brought a
population loss of at least 60%, with only 40-45,000 individuals remaining by 1352.9 Once
human bodies are exposed to a disease, however, they have a tendency to build resistance against
potential future contact with the pathogen. This phenomenon appears in what may have
demoralized plague witnesses the most: the fact that child mortality greatly surpassed adult
mortality in the recurring waves of outbreak. While this was tragic in itself, the economic reality
of the situation was that adult workers were very difficult to replace and drastically needed in
plague-devastated cities like Florence.

Florentine Politics and Society
Florence in the mid-to-late fourteenth century was an active hub of commerce and the
budding center of Italian humanist philosophy. Politically, the city continued the medieval
rivalry of the Guelph and Ghibelline factions, the former traditionally supporting the papacy and
the latter the Holy Roman Emperor in a battle over authority that stretched back to the Investiture
Controversy of the mid-11th century. Beginning in the late 11th and early 12th centuries, dozens of
cities in central and northern Italy, referred to in that period as the “Italic Kingdom” subjugated
to the Holy Roman Emperor, began slowly taking advantage of the Emperor’s inability to
maintain order in his holdings across the Alps. One-by-one they obtained independence, some
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becoming signorial duchies such as Milan and others opting for republicanism like Florence.
Florence itself remained a staunchly Guelph city, which became particularly problematic when it
entered into the War of the Eight Saints against Pope Gregory XI in 1375 over territorial conflict.
Florence effectively functioned as a limited republic, with major offices rotating
approximately every two months. The most coveted of these included the Gonfaloniere della
Giustizia (lit. “Standard-bearer of Justice”), who effectively functioned as the mayor of the city,
and his advisors the eight priori (“priors/lords prior”). Combined, they formed the main
executive body of Florentine government, the Signoria, who took up residence in the Palazzo
della Signoria, the location at which much of the action during the revolts took place. The
Signoria were formally required to meet with two other elected councils: the Dodici Buonuomini
(Twelve Good Men) and Seidici Gonfalonieri (Sixteen Standard-bearers, four from each of
Florence’s four districts), both of which served as lesser advisory bodies.10 Additional offices
included seats on legislative bodies, judicial positions, and the office of the podestà, who had
originally been a supreme magistrate called in during times of emergency to resolve conflict, but
who by this time was more involved in civil order and defense. Qualification for all offices,
however, was restricted to those who paid for membership in one of Florence’s guilds (including
seven major and fourteen minor guilds) and came from the proper social standing. This meant
that a significant number of individuals remained without the ability to hold office, though
sometimes popular-minded guildsmen did obtain these positions. Such was the case when a
populist committee was appointed as the Otto della Guerra (lit. “Eight of War”) at the onset of
the War of the Eight Saints to oversee the conflict. 11
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This system existed alongside a societal divide between the urban upper-class popolo
grosso (lit. “fat people,” mostly consisting of bankers, lawyers, wealthy merchants, and major
guildsmen) and the popolo minuto (common people), the former of whom gradually accrued
wealth and political influence during the fourteenth century. Between the extremes of the few
rich and the throngs of the poor were a number of lesser guildsmen—skilled, average-to-low-pay
artisans who were similarly barred from positions of governmental authority like the poor, but
who possessed guild membership and whose economic situations were not quite as desperate.
These lesser guildsmen constituted the closest thing to a middle class that Florence could boast
in the fourteenth century, though the wealthy popolo grosso consistently remembered themselves
as the middle class below the traditional nobility.
With the crisis of the plague, however, had come a reconfiguring of Italian and Florentine
society. The immense demographic loss inflicted by the plague created a massive demand for
laborers in both urban and rural settings. Landlords paid higher wages to the highly demanded
peasants, but comparatively the wages of urban workers surpassed those of their countryside
counterparts. This resulted from the relatively higher mortality rate inflicted by the plague in
urban settings, generating in condensed areas a demand for labor higher than that generated by
the much more expansive and relatively more labor-plentiful countryside. 12 What followed was
an influx of individuals, particularly young males seeking greater opportunities for themselves,
into cites such as Florence. Owing to both the restricted institutions (namely the guilds) of
Renaissance Florence as well as the cultural differences between city and country life, many of
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these individuals experienced difficulty and frustration in conforming to the customs of their new
urban lives.13
In the years leading up to the Ciompi Revolt, these changes in society began to reflect in
Florence’s socioeconomic demographics. Poverty was still a constant challenge for the
inhabitants of the city, including those who had migrated from the countryside. Although wages
had reached a relative peak, many workers continued to face the challenges of debt, taxation, and
unemployment.14 Data from the Catasto of 1427 reveal that approximately 1% (100 families) of
all Florentines controlled over a quarter of the city’s wealth. 15 In 1457, moreover, approximately
28% of the city’s inhabitants were classified under the tax bracket of miserabili, meaning that
they were paupers with virtually no wealth or property, while an additional 35% (over 3700
households) fell into the next-lowest bracket of “below 5 soldi.” 16 Additionally, one of the few
industries that did not suffer a loss of production because of the post-plague population loss was
the highly successful luxury industry, which in Florence mainly included the production of fine
fabrics. 17 The distribution of wealth and the emphasis given to luxury production reveal which
segment of society Florence’s economic agenda favored, or, more directly, who controlled its
formation.
This was the chaotic world in which the Ciompi found themselves beset on all sides by
disease, poverty, war, underrepresentation, and the affluence of governors largely apathetic to
their situation. Florence, though nominally a republic, was characterized by a great class division
with regard to political participation in the mid-late fourteenth century. The individuals who
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protested for greater representation in the post-plague period did so out of discontent not only
with the economic conditions forced upon them by the very plague whose recurring destruction
had demoralized them over the past few decades, but also with the individuals who continued to
accumulate their own stores of wealth in the face of economic catastrophe. An analysis of the
Ciompi Revolt therefore demands an economic approach, but one inclusive of the Black Death’s
repercussions as well as the rampant wealth and political inequality proliferating throughout
Florence. I argue that the Ciompi Revolt resulted from the post-plague, urban migrations of
surviving peasants who, after arriving, were economically restricted from participation in the
very institutions which they believed could afford them a better life.

Origins of the Revolutionaries: The Economic Effects of the Black Death (1348-78)
As it killed potentially two-thirds of Europe’s population in the mid-fourteenth century, it
is difficult to exaggerate the effects of the Black Death, whether medical, psychological, or
economical. The most significant effects for purposes of this analysis, however, were those tied
to the economy, particularly the high rate of urbanization that followed an enormous loss in
urban labor. Urban employers raised wages to attract replacement workers, and these higher
wages in towns and cities became the main facilitator of the urbanization process. The wages
themselves resulted from the difference in productivity between the urban and rural sectors, i.e.,
the greater population density of urban environments (even after the plague) continued to create
a higher demand for goods, which allowed for higher prices and generated greater nominal
revenue for businesses.18 The higher the differential between urban and rural production, price
levels, and demand, the greater the urban wage level and the level of migration tended to be.
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While urban areas typically demanded goods and investments, their rural counterparts demanded
the commodities produced by artisans in cities. 19 Consequently, rural populations became
interested in the city and its amenities when the gap between urban and rural wages widened in
favor of the urbanites. Their migrations continued throughout the fifteenth century as well, with
the result that 25% of Western Europe’s population lived in central/northern Italian cities by
1500.20
City governments frequently gave young people other incentives to urbanize as well,
usually in the form of easier guild membership for those who qualified. Since many migrants lost
their families to the plague, the decision to leave the countryside for greater opportunities was
not difficult to make.21 Additionally, land rents and food prices did not fall to expected levels in
countryside because the workers who remained labored on the more fertile land, and the excess,
less productive land was left to go fallow. Rents for the superior lands that were in use often
remained relatively high.22 The loss of rural workers also resulted in less food production overall,
though when this was coupled with an overall drop in the demand for food thanks to the broader
population loss, the price level of food decreased less than expected. What the rural laborers did
manage to produce, however, was made “more efficiently and easily, perhaps with those who
remained to farm the land garnering more for their labor and living better than they had
before.”23 Italy’s urban working population thus quickly recovered thanks to appealing
incentives in the cities coupled with high rents and unchanged food prices in the countryside.
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It must be emphasized that the Black Death did not simply arrive in Europe in 1348,
cause death on such a massive scale, and disappear from the scene. While the outbreak between
1348-52 was responsible for the largest portion of the overall population loss, the plague did
return in recurring outbreaks across Europe in both the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with
the outbreak of 1374 being the most relevant for Florence in this period. 24 Since the plague’s
impact affected the demand for labor and the value of wages in both urban and rural areas, these
recurring outbreaks caused miniature spikes in both labor demand and wages that attracted more
new men into urban environments. This allows for the interpretation that the revolutionaries of
1378 did not arrive en masse in the years of the initial outbreak, but that they instead came to the
city over the course of the next three decades, with a decent portion likely arriving after 1374.
Had they all arrived in the late 1340s/early 1350s instead, it is likely that the relatively short
lifespan of the Middle Ages would have claimed them before they had the opportunity to revolt.
Once they arrived in Florence, however, these migrants found conditions quite contrary
to what the city’s incentives had promised them. It was not uncommon for municipal
governments across Europe to pass legislation “not only to contain rising wages and to limit the
peasant’s mobility but also to allay a sense of disquietude and disorientation arising from the
Black Death’s buffeting of pre—plague social realities,” and Florence was no exception.25 The
higher wages promised to them by employers, then, turned out to be a false rumor which
generated a high level of irritation among the migrants. The result was that a large number of
new arrivals joined the Florentine poor in subsistence living, even when they enjoyed high levels
of employment and the occasional dip in the price of bread. 26 Furthermore, wages have been
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shown to have actually declined in the decade leading up to the revolts of 1378, providing further
stimulus for the rebellion.27 Factoring in the devaluation of the penny, in which most urban
laborers were paid, during the War of the Eight Saints, the financial situation of many common
Florentines is seen to have grown increasingly destitute after the plague, contrary to what the city
had originally guaranteed them. 28

Socioeconomics in Renaissance Florence
Alongside the perils of the Black Death, the commoners of Florence endured yet another
plague in the form of immense socioeconomic inequality in the years leading up to the Ciompi
Revolt. The beginnings of this phase of inequality can be traced back to the successes of the
original popolo, “the people” of the medieval commune who sought to curtail noble influence by
uniting as wealthy middle class merchants and guildsmen, in the mid-late 13th century.29 Much of
the traditional medieval nobility were disenfranchised when the popolo government issued the
Ordinances of Justice in 1293, a set of laws which labeled certain noble families as magnates.
Possessing the status of magnate frequently prevented an individual from obtaining political
office or guild membership and required his family to pay a large sum of money to the
government if the magnate committed what the Ordinances defined as “improper behavior.”30
Having lent their influence toward the passage of the Ordinances, the popolo gradually
transformed into the popolo grosso, Florence’s rising “middle class” of bankers, merchants,
lawyers, and major guildsmen, whose wealth held great influence over the government. They
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became an increasingly exclusive group, changing citizenship requirements to include
“membership in a guild” and “property qualifications or minimum tax assessments,” while
membership in the guilds themselves was changed to include residence and taxation
requirements as well as high entry fees. 31 Members of the popolo grosso easily obtained guild
membership and, because virtually all political offices required guild membership of their
holders, came to dominate the councils, juries, and Signoria of Florentine government.32 With
the passing of the 1293 Ordinances, they largely removed the old nobility from the power
equation of urban politics, leaving them only the urban masses to contend with.
Those masses are referred to as the popolo minuto, the segment of society that encompassed
laborers, paupers, and all those who held no guild membership, but who frequently worked for
those who did hold guild membership. 33 This included the group that would become known as the
Ciompi, which largely originated from the laborers of the Lana, the major guild of the wool
manufacturers in Florence. Skilled artisans and lesser guildsmen still occupied a sort of middle
rank between the grosso and minuto classes, but their concerns about underrepresentation often
aligned with those of the minuto. Debt and taxes routinely put a great amount of economic pressure
on the members of these classes in Renaissance Florence. In 1427, approximately 81% of textileworker households reported debts on average equal to 55% of their assets, implying that much of
their earned money was quickly used up in repaying these debts.34 Moreover, 30% of all the city’s
households reported that their debts exceeded their assets in that same year. 35
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Debt could also be a profitable situation, however, as demonstrated by the popolo grosso.
The income of many Renaissance cities initially depended on taxes and state monopolies on certain
staples like salt and grain. As expensive warfare became more commonplace in the 14 th century,
it soon became apparent that these methods did not fully cover the cities’ needs. Many
governments resorted to taking voluntary loans from wealthy families, which later became forced
loans based on a family’s wealth during the more difficult times in which they hesitated to give.36
Deficit spending was thus quite common in Renaissance Italy, as governments like Florence’s
routinely operated on funds which they had taken out from one wealthy family in order to pay back
another. This mass of governmental/public debt was known as Il Monte (“the mountain”), and it
became a growing problem in most cities, as the government was supposed to repay its forced
loans at around 5% interest, made more difficult by the presence of debt owed to other families.37
Ordinarily this would have qualified the lenders for the sin of usury (charging interest on loans),
but since this was viewed as a service to the government, it was not uncommon for the sin to be
“quietly overlooked.”38
Instead, the government became a producer of additional revenues via interest for the
groups who could afford to lend, namely the members of the popolo grosso. As their guild
membership granted them significant presence in the government, the popolo grosso saw little
harm in lending money to a government that was both run by themselves and obligated to pay
them back with profit. 39 “Corruption” may qualify as understatement when attempting to describe
how the popolo grosso abused the government’s debt for their own gain, as they essentially turned
what was meant to be a public body into a valued customer of their banking enterprises. While this
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helped ensure that the popolo grosso would always support the government, for the popolo minuto,
this only furthered the idea that government was inaccessible to the lower classes who could
neither purchase a share of the debt nor obtain the guild membership necessary for holding office.
Keeping in mind that economic status directly impacted an individual’s ability to
influence or participate in government, we shall now take a comparative look at the respective
wealth possessed by certain segments of the popolo grosso and popolo minuto. The primary
sources utilized in this analysis will be records from the Catasto of 1427. Originally created in
order to better determine on whom a loan should be forced, the Florentine Catasti are collections
of tax data from various years throughout Florence’s history, with the Catasto of 1427
constituting the most complete record. Earlier records of Florence’s tax data do exist and date
back to 1371 in the form of the Estimi, which generally are less comprehensive and reliable than
the Catasti.40 Additionally, the Estimi only exist as original, archival documents, rendering them
inaccessible for this study.
While it would be ideal to consult sources from the 1370s in an argument about the 1378
Ciompi Revolt, it is not necessary to do so in order to provide a general idea of the inequality
pervasive throughout Renaissance Italy. As one scholar notes in his usage of the Catasto to
evaluate working conditions leading up to the Revolt, “It is difficult to imagine that the situation
was much different in the 1370s.”41 Since this Catasto reflects the society of nearly half a century
after the 1378 Ciompi Revolt, its purpose in this paper will not be to provide detailed, precise
data that correspond directly to the ruling classes or to the individuals who participated in the
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revolt, as such data are both unnecessary and nearly impossible to come by. Rather, the Catasto
will aid in painting a broader picture of the wealth inequality in Renaissance Florence that
prevented the Ciompi and other revolutionaries from obtaining their coveted guild membership
and might have spurred them to revolt. The Catasto provides a wealth of information about each
head of household (those who actually reported their family’s tax data) in Florence, including
name, age, type and location of dwelling, place of origin, trade (occupation), taxable income, and
other economic assets. This study will focus on the aspects that will aid in determining an
individual’s total wealth as well as a few personal details that may illuminate how the wealth was
spent. It should be noted, however, that the Catasto only gives occupations for 44% of the names
listed, a far more complete record than many contemporary documents, but incomplete
nonetheless. 42
The revolutionaries of 1378 consisted of the Ciompi as well as artisans and laborers from
a variety of professions, but laborers under the employ of wealthy wool manufacturers made a
strong presence. This is reflected by a list of new office holders in July 1378, found in the
Cronaca Prima d’Anonimo:
“On July 25th they named (as lords prior):
Michele di Lando, Standard-bearer of Justice
Lioncino, pettinatore (wool comber)
Salvestro Compiobbesi
Ispinello Borsi
Giovanni d’Agnolo Capponi
Bonaccorso del Cimiero, pettinatore (wool comber)
Benedetto da Carlone, calzolaio (shoemaker)
As standard-bearers of their municipal districts:
Nicolò di Vanni Pelacane
42
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Ciardo di Ciardo, vinattiere (retail wine salesman)
Giovanni di Giovanni, cardatore (wool carder)
Bruno di Pagolo, maliscalco (horseshoer)
Guido Fagni
Il Mezza di Iacopo di Mezza
Nicolò di Vanni Nelli.
As members of the twelve good men:
Duccio degli Alberti
Lo Smacca, fabbro (blacksmith)
Chiavaccino, cardatore (wool carder).”43
Several of the men listed come from more illustrious families, as is shown by their use of
family names instead of or in addition to patronyms. Their presence may point to the first
revolutionary wave’s willingness to compromise and negotiate when compared to the second.
More interesting, however, are their counterparts’ occupations, which include several of those
listed under “trade 61” in the Catasto of 1427. Trade 61 includes several different types of
manual laborers in the wool guild, namely the same pettinatori (combers) and cardatori (carders)
listed above as well as the scegliatori (sorters).44 These individuals comprised the most humble
laborers of the wool guild, whose jobs mainly involved the refining and cleaning of raw wool so
that it could be spun and woven into textile products. Additional workers of the wool guild
included the cimatori (shearers), who are represented by trade 62 in the Catasto.45 While the
majority of men and women living in Florence in 1378 were not guild members, the laborers of
Florence’s textile industries were relegated to the even lower status of “legal subjects of the wool
and silk guilds rather than free citizens,” which prevented them from ever obtaining
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membership. 46 Since the Cronaca Prima and other records47 suggest that these woolworkers
played the dominant role in the revolutionary activities of 1378, individuals employed in the
same occupations in 1427 will be used to convey the economic status of the poor in Renaissance
Florence. The Catasto of 1427 includes data from 203 men employed under trade 61 and 34
employed under trade 62.48 Table 1 offers some statistics regarding the ten laborers from
occupations encompassed by trade 61 who have the least valuable total economic assets. All
monetary values are recorded in florins, the minted currency of Florence.
Table 1: Florence’s Ten Woolworkers with the Lowest Total Economic Assets in 142749
Name

Patronymic
50

Family
Name

Age

Marital
Status
Married

Bocche51

Trade

Housing

Pub.
Invest.53
0

Real
Estate54
0

Total55

Taxable56

Renter

Priv.
Invest.52
0

2

61

0

0

1

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0

Niccolaio

Manuccio

55

Zanobi

Bartolo

79

Iacopo

Berto

80

Widowed

5

61

Owner

0

0

0

0

0

Giovanni

Domenico

38

Married

6

61

Owner

0

0

0

0

0

Nanni

Giovanni

26

Married

3

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0

Antonio

Albizzo

30

2

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0

Berto

Bartolomeo

44

1

61

Owner

0

0

0

0

0

Bartolomeo Giovanni

27

Married

2

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0

Iacopo

Luca

23

Married

4

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0

Leonardo

Bartolo

56

Widowed

4

61

Renter

0

0

0

0

0
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The most noticeable aspect of this table is that each man reported a value of “0” for his
total economic assets. This does not suggest that the individual was entirely destitute (he was
employed, after all), but it does suggest that his low wage prevented him from making any kind
of public or private investment (both of which would have been needed for guild membership
had he not been legally restricted from joining) and that he owned no property other than his
probably very modest dwelling. A zero may simply imply that the individual’s total assets for
that year were less than one florin in value, as Florentines also used the soldo and the denaro,
two coins of lesser value, in this period. The same applies to his taxable assets, which include the
total value of his assets minus any deductions for which he might have qualified. The number of
individuals in a household was one potential qualifier of deductions, but this was not
guaranteed.57
The precise ranges of these tax brackets varied slightly over time, but an example from
the Catasto of 1481 shows that all denizens with taxable assets of less than 50 florins were
lumped into a “7.0%” rate, effectively meaning that 7% of their taxable assets went to the
government.58 If a similar rate were to be applied to woolworkers with less than 1 florin of
assets, they would potentially lose money that, at this level of subsistence, could be essential to
survival. It is also worth mentioning that several of these men, as heads of household, would
likely have been primary breadwinners in a home of four, five, or six individuals. Needless to
say, the economic strain of a dismally low wage tightened even further when split among
multiple people.
What is most telling, however, is that these ten only serve as examples for the ninety-two
individuals under trade 61 who filed a “0” for their total assets in 1427. With 203 total responses,
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it is evident that 45% of the workers in trade 61 lived in economic conditions similar to those
described above. 59 163 workers (80%) also fell into the bracket “below 50 florins” and qualified
for the lowest tax rate of 7%.60 The shearers of trade 62 fared better but still saw a large number
of impoverished individuals, with around 15% of workers filing a “0” for total assets and 53%
falling under the “below 50 florins” taxable assets bracket.61 However, their small sample size in
the Catasto of only 34 individuals prevents their statistics from being conclusive. These statistics
reveal, in general, that a great number of employed Florentines lived with very little, not to
mention the thousands of unemployed paupers who owned nearly nothing. For a relatively small
number of woolworkers, however, this hardship was not the case, as Table 2 indicates.
Table 2: Florence’s Ten Woolworkers with the Greatest Total Economic Assets in 142762
Name

Patronymic

Family
Name

Age

Bocche

Trade

Housing

71

Marital
Status
Married

Pub.
Invest.
128

Real
Estate
163

Total

Taxable

Owner

Priv.
Invest.
772

5

61

1063

1057

58

Married

4

61

Renter

84

160

768

1012

839

Piero

Giovanni

Antonio

Andrea

Federigo

Francesco

32

Widowed

2

61

Renter

51

0

793

844

652

Niccolo

Mariano

60

Married

5

61

Owner

105

0

564

669

549

Francesco

Bartolomeo

26

Married

5

61

Owner

88

0

579

667

511

Giovanni

Niccolo

65

Married

3

61

Renter

500

0

113

613

513

Maffeo

Guiduccio

70

Widowed

7

61

510

0

64

574

436

Domenico

Benedetto

35

Married

5

61

Renter

51

0

399

450

355

Papi

Maso

34

Married

7

61

Renter

188

0

240

428

245

Piero

Agnolo

71

Married

2

61

Owner

40

0

319

359

315

Filippi

Guiducci

A few things are immediately noticeable. Two individuals are recorded with family
names, indicating that they were born into a higher station to begin with. Each individual also
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accumulated enough wealth to feel comfortable with making private investments, and two
decided to invest in the government’s public debt. They each own property besides their personal
dwelling, and nine of the ten would have fallen into the two highest 1481 tax brackets of 300 and
400 florins, respectively taxed at 21 and 22% each. 63 As shown earlier, however, these workers
constituted a small minority of the 203 total, most of whom fell into the lowest brackets or had
very little at all. As we turn our attention to Florence’s bankers, however, we will begin to see
how numbers far in excess of the woolworkers’ earnings were a common occurrence, as shown
in Table 3.
Table 3: Florence’s Ten Wealthiest Members of the Banking Guild (Cambio) in 1427 64
Name

Patronymic

Family
Name
Barbadori

Age

Bocche

Trade

Housing

65

Marital
Status
Married

Owner

Priv.
Invest.
22351

Pub.
Invest.
5650

Real
Estate
3772

8

23

46

Married

9

23

Owner

3763

14562

Giovanni

Donato

Giovanni

Barduccio

Ridolfo

Bonifazio

Peruzzi

57

Married

12

23

Owner

16903

Iacopo

Piero

Baroncelli

44

Married

8

23

Owner

Isau

Agnolo

Martellini

55

Married

8

23

Averardo

Francesco

Medici

54

Married

10

Battista

Niccolo

Guicciardini

34

Married

Giovanni

Niccolo

Guicciardini

30

Bernardo

Cristofano

Carnesecchi

Antonio

Piero

Benizzi

Total

Taxable

31773

20887

12991

31316

21740

2937

3686

23526

22892

11300

9559

2212

23071

19283

Owner

5820

5046

7503

18369

14775

23

Owner

4082

5773

7579

17434

16497

3

23

Owner

4172

4802

7583

16557

11654

Married

3

23

Owner

315

8825

3950

13090

11049

79

Widowed

4

23

Owner

7061

3595

305

10916

6791

79

Married

11

23

Owner

6586

1082

948

8616

6342

Since family names are used for nine of the ten, it is quite apparent that these men
frequented the upper echelons of society. Additionally, several names indicate origin from
politically prominent families, notably the Medici, Guicciardini, and Peruzzi. The individuals on
this list, however, don’t even reflect the richest men of the city, as several of them were not
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members of the guild (reflected by trade 23) at the time of the Catasto and thus claimed other
occupations in the official records. Two of them, Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici (owner and
founder of the Medici Bank) and Palla Nofri Strozzi held staggering total assets of 91,089 and
162,906 florins, respectively. 65
The vast public and private investments of these individuals show additional sources of
income through interest. Taxable assets for these individuals were reduced by the amount they
had contributed to the public debt, i.e., they received a tax deduction for issuing loans on which
they would profit from interest. While it is important to consider the taxable assets of these
individuals, a common practice in the time of the Ciompi Revolt was to forgo taxing those who
made significant contributions to the public debt.66 Meanwhile, woolworkers like the Ciompi and
the rest of the urban poor were so impoverished that they took out loans in order to pay their
taxes, generating further profit via interest for the banking class.67 The Catasto lists a total of
twenty-two men as members of the banking guild, among whom more famous names such as
Albizzi and Machiavelli show up.68 Of this number, the banker with the lowest total assets
records a value of 80 florins, interestingly lower than the top tier of woolworkers, but far greater
than the average recorded by those same individuals. 69 Moreover, the median value of total
assets recorded by the bankers was 7,431 florins, far more than the median of even the top ten
woolworkers.70 Table four reveals similar figures for members of the Wool Manufacturers’ and
Merchants’ Guild.
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Table 4: Florence’s Ten Wealthiest Members of the Wool Manufacturers’ and Merchants’ Guild
(Arte della Lana) in 142771
Name

Patronymic

Bernardo

Lamberto

Family
Name
Lamberteschi

Age

Bocche

Trade

Housing

61

Marital
Status
Married

Owner

Priv.
Invest
23296

Pub.
Invest
20573

Real
Estate
4012

8

24

Giovanni

Domenico

Giugni

50

Married

14

24

Owner

15561

4139

Domenico

Nofri

Busini

53

Married

6

24

Renter

4278

Francesco

Benozzo

60

Married

8

24

Owner

Total

Taxable

47871

43327

8086

27786

23607

17601

4302

26181

24343

8743

10031

4547

23321

21690

Castello

Piero

Quaratesi

32

Married

2

24

Owner

5782

13570

2370

21722

21453

Bartolo

Nofri

Bischeri

57

Married

9

24

Owner

3689

13485

3672

20846

6113

Daniello

Nofri

Dazzo

30

Married

2

24

Owner

12221

2575

3446

1870

16373

Toso

Albizzo

Dafortuna

30

Married

7

24

Owner

11709

2057

2888

16654

15739

Schiatta

Uberto

Ridolfi

62

Married

12

24

Owner

3873

5785

4049

13707

12334

Andrea

Lando

Fortini

50

3

24

Owner

9268

2724

1700

13692

13562

Florence’s prominence as a first-rate textile producer is attested by the success of these
individuals, many of whom traded their products on an international level. These are the same
men who likely employed—but did not supervise, as many supervisors participated in the revolt
themselves—the woolworkers. Their private and public investments rival or surpass those of the
bankers, with whom they would have shared the privilege of having their taxes written off. With
a colossal 20,573 florins in public investment, Bernardo Lamberteschi was the 9th largest
investor in the public debt in the entire city. 72 In total, 123 guild members reported their assets to
the Catasto, with 5,080 florins being the lowest value of total assets recorded on a single
member. Each one of them held investments in the public and private sectors, implying that their
wealth was set to increase with time. 73 Their affluence stands in direct contrast to the poverty of
their lowest, increasingly disgruntled employees.
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Put simply, many of the artisans and laborers who revolted in July 1378 were heavily
impoverished and struggling to provide for themselves and their families. Meanwhile, the
bankers who determined their laws and the businessmen who employed them were accruing
profit not only from their own enterprises, but also from interest gained on loans made to the
government. The workers’ socioeconomic status prevented them from obtaining access to the
halls of government in which they could alter their situation, so they resorted to violence in an
effort to be heard. The stage was set, and the revolutionaries lacked only a political catalyst to set
things in motion. Beginning in 1375, they would receive just that.

Tensions Rising: Guelphs, Ghibellines, and the War of the Eight Saints (1375-78)
The catalyst arrived in the form of the War of the Eight Saints, a territorial conflict
between Florence and a pope who was still based in Avignon rather than Rome. Ultimately, the
war proved more disastrous internally for Florence than externally, as the city’s public debt
skyrocketed to new levels to fund the war efforts, placing great strain on the economy. Perhaps
more important, however, are the political ripple effects from the war felt by Florence’s highly
divided political parties: the Guelphs and the Ghibellines.
The war began when Gregory XI, the last of the Avignon Popes, ended a conflict with
Milan in 1375 and allowed his mercenary troops to patrol the borders which he theoretically
shared with Florence, but which had been gradually slipping out of the papacy’s control since its
departure from Italy in 1309. 74 As is frequently the case with mercenaries, however, their leader
John Hawkwood was willing to abandon the fight for greater pay, and thus he was dissuaded
from attacking Florence for a fee of 130,000 florins. 75 Assuming 14th-century chronicler
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Giovanni Villani’s numbers for the Florentine budget in the 1330s held roughly consistent a few
decades later, Hawkwood’s payment would have amounted to almost half of Florence’s 300,000
florin annual income. 76 While it did force the city into a financial situation that would be felt by
the commoners, this payment did not put a permanent stop to the conflict, as the war still
continued in small skirmishes as well as by less physical means.
Incensed at the actions of Gregory XI, Florence’s government appointed an eight-man
assembly known as the Otto della Guerra (The Eight of War) to manage all aspects of their
conflict with the Pope.77 This assembly had the idea to acquire the funds for paying off
Hawkwood by forcing a loan onto members of Florence’s local clergy and by selling church
property, which technically violated canon law protecting church property from secular
taxation. 78 In response, the Pope issued an interdict against the city, forbidding certain religious
activities, including services and mass, from taking place within its territory. A war of ideologies
began when Florence fired back in defense of “republican liberty and the guild regime of the
popolo against the return of papal tyranny and corruption in Italy.”79 Florence found allies and
encouraged open dissent in several guild-based cities of the Papal States such as Perugia and
Bologna, which were weary of pontiffs ruling from afar in Avignon. 80 Coluccio Salutati,
Chancellor of Florence, humanist scholar, and mentor to Leonardo Bruni, was the primary agent
who encouraged these rebellions. Utilizing rhetorical skills imparted by the finest humanist
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education, he wrote letters to several Papal State cities, encouraging them to throw off the papal
reigns and embrace the popolo tradition of guild republicanism like Florence had done.81
Florence’s actions did not come without consequence, however, as a papal interdict
carried serious weight across the Christian world. The immediate concern was the lack of
religious services in Florence, a monumental disturbance to the city’s Guelph, god-fearing
population. To alleviate some of the tension, the government actually ordered the city’s clergy in
1377 to defy Gregory’s interdict and commence services again, but several church officials fled
Florence in rebellion, and those who stayed, along with most of the citizens, were dubious of the
services’ validity. 82 The interdict had a more long-term economic impact, as it theoretically
prevented European rulers from dealing with Florentine banks. The banks, however, held great
influence over many rulers as the lenders who financially sustained their governments and war
efforts, frequently making them more valuable allies than even the vicar of Christ.83 It was thus
common for rulers to cleverly and conveniently overlook the interdict in their interactions with
Florence’s bankers.
Regarding the Ciompi Revolt, however, what ultimately resulted from this conflict was
the distancing of several Florentine political bodies, most notably the Eight of War themselves,
from Florence’s usually dominant Parte Guelfa (Guelph Party), always loyal to the papacy.
During the war, the Eight had taken up the title of “The Eight Saints,” in order to convey the
sense that they were just, godly men struggling against the injustices of a corrupt and violent
pope.84 Such an action broke with several centuries of Florentine tradition of being a reliable
papal ally. Indeed, the elections of July 1375 saw the city formally/governmentally discard its
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Guelph alliances, aligning itself politically with the major Ghibelline city of Milan. 85 Eventually
the pope returned to Rome from Avignon in 1377 to manage his affairs in the peninsula more
directly, but after the loss of his mercenaries to Florentine coin and the outright rebellion of
many smaller cities in his domain, he was more reluctant to continue the war.86 Florence also
tired of the fighting, and peace negotiations began in late 1377. Pope Gregory suddenly died (“of
an unbearable bladder pain”) in April 1378, and the resultant confusion meant that peace
negotiations were stalled.87 The papacy eventually forced Florence to pay an indemnity of
250,000 florins as well as to pay 5% interest on the value of all church property confiscated/sold
during the war, and because the debt-laden city did not have the funds to repay this immediately,
the lost property essentially became the church’s investment in Florence’s public debt. 88
No one had expected this war to last three years, however, and the Eight were now
incurring greater criticism from their Guelph enemies in the summer of 1378. During the war,
tensions between the Eight and the popolo grosso citizens of the Parte Guelfa had begun to rise
because the Eight were suspected of favoring the commoners of Florence. As the war dragged
on, their term of office and magistracy was extended several times, which further exacerbated
tensions between the groups.89 Additionally, the Eights’conflict with the pope and his interdict
opened them to criticism from Florence’s large population of papal loyalists, many of whom
began openly “cursing” them for their actions during war. The Parte Guelfa also received support
from the old nobility, who wished to see the popular Eight removed and who themselves
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comprised a sizeable portion of the Parte. While the commoners remained loyal to the Eight
throughout the conflict, the nobility began using the Parte Guelfa apparatus as a means of
attacking the Eight and their supporters and excluding them from office by alleging that they had
descended from Ghibellines.90 The Parte Guelfa grossly overstepped, however, when it labeled
as Ghibellines its traditional allies—the major guildsmen of the popolo grosso, who were then
driven into alliance with the lesser guildsmen against the Guelphs, as we shall see. 91
As if poverty, humble social origin, and the label of “Ghibelline” weren’t enough to keep
Florence’s lower classes from obtaining guild membership and public office, the Parte Guelfa
and its supporters also introduced the so-called “Law of Admonition,” which “warned” the Eight
and their supporters to not to take up public office and actively declared them unfit to do so.92
This political contest between opposing social factions in the early summer of 1378 served to
highlight Florence’s societal divide, which already existed in the form of immense inequality in
wealth and representation, and to provide the immediate trigger for the violent months that
followed. If the average revolutionary had been highly dissatisfied with his socioeconomic
condition for the past several months or years, the tensions of that summer are what finally
compelled him to act on his feelings.

The Ciompi Revolt(s) and Political Turmoil (1378-82)
What actually followed the Guelph-Ghibelline power struggle later that summer is not
adequately contained in the title “Ciompi Revolt.” Rather, it involved two distinct social
movements of violence and protest led and performed by two distinct social groups. The first,
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known as the July Revolution, was initiated by a contingent of skilled artisans and lesser
guildsmen supported by throngs of the city’s most humble workers, all of whom demanded
greater guild and political representation. The second, known as the August Revolution, was
much more radical in nature and involved a contingent of those humble workers, better known as
the Ciompi, struggling for those same desires against new political alliances which excluded
them. While these revolts are frequently merged together in our memory as one “Ciompi Revolt
of 1378,” further analysis reveals a distinction between the two separate incidents.
This analysis of the revolts draws mainly from two primary sources, the Cronaca Prima
d’Anonimo and Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine People. The anonymous chronicle in
general takes a much more sympathetic view of the revolutionaries and presents them and their
actions relatively favorably. In contrast, Bruni’s account depicts the revolutionaries (perhaps not
completely inaccurately) more as a rampaging mob (“multitudo”) bent on destroying the city’s
political liberty, the acquisition and maintenance of which is the central theme of his entire
chronicle. For Bruni, political liberty meant the triumph and survival of guild-based
republicanism and the flourishing of the nobility-conquering popolo grosso. Because the
revolutionaries desired to reform the popolo grosso-dominated government, they represented a
direct threat to his interests and philosophy. Given that he wrote his account in the 1420s during
the peak of the popolo grosso’s power and just before the Medici consolidated themselves as the
unofficial lords of Florence, his interpretation of events is not surprising. A balanced use of these
sources allows for minimal bias in the analysis.
With the month of July upon them, the Parte Guelfa continued to label various citizens,
including, again, major guildsmen of the popolo grosso, as Ghibellines for supporting the war
effort, and certain denizens of Florence grew disenchanted with the hostile political climate of
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the status quo. Believing that the Law of Admonition had been used beyond its reasonable limits,
Standard-bearer of Justice Salvestro de’Medici called for the law’s reform and the reinstitution
of the Ordinances of Justice of 1293, a direct assault on the nobility of the Parte Guelfa. 93 This
episode was highly reminiscent of the original events of 1293, with a (Medici) member of the
popolo grosso leading the effort to curb noble influence. But perhaps no one had grown quite so
infuriated with the power struggle between what they likely perceived as two camps of equally
excessively wealthy individuals as those whom Bruni labels as “plebs,” the skilled artisans and
lesser guildsmen of the city. Fearing resistance to Salvestro’s reform, they and the “city mob”
(“multitudo urbana”) ran through the streets and set fire to the homes of many within the Parte
Guelfa who had employed the Law of Admonition, though many of the “optimates” themselves
were either hiding or had fled the city, which likely prevented the revolutionaries from killing
them.94 With his opposition adventitiously neutralized, Salvestro passed his legislation and
terminated the Law of Admonition. Many of those men whom the mob had targeted were exiled
(if they hadn’t already left) or declared magnates, rendering them politically impotent.95
New elections, including those for new priors, were held shortly after that. Around the
same time, “mostly poor men from the lower class” began holding “nocturnal meetings” in
which they decided to obtain a guild of their own as well as a place on the priorate.96 Bruni’s
exact Latin phrasing implies that these men were “from the lowest plebs” (“ex minima plebe”)
and the fact that the phrase is in apposition to the “multitudo urbana,” suggests that he means for
the lowest rankings of the plebs to represent the unskilled laborers, i.e. the most humble workers
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of the city. His use of the term “plebs” without modification, then, can be taken as a higher form
of the lower social class, namely the skilled artisans and lesser guildsmen. Both of these groups
were instrumental in the next phase of the revolution, as they had been in removing the Law of
Admonition, and Bruni cites agitation with the “discords amongst the greater citizens” as the
reason for which they began holding meetings and taking further action. 97 Once the new priors,
now headed by Standard-bearer of Justice Luigi Guicciardini, had discovered their plots, they
took captive four members of the lowest plebs to discover their motives “and punished them for
having held private discussions about constitutional innovations.” 98 A contingent of both skilled
artisans and the most humble workers then surrounded the Palazzo della Signoria (Palace of the
Priors) demanding the return of the prisoners, and when the priors refused to yield, they burned
Luigi Guicciardini’s residence to the ground. They then took to the streets, attacking and burning
the homes of the rich in several locations. 99 Having captured the magistrate chosen to quell their
rebellion, they dragged him into the Piazza della Signoria (central square), hung him within view
of the priors, and tore his body to pieces.” 100
This represents a shifting of the recipients of popular violence from persons of noble or
magnate status to those of popolo grosso status, i.e. those major guildsmen whose families and
associates both dominated Florentine politics and employed the most humble workers of the city.
Indeed, the artisans and laborers had at this point worked together to perform similar acts of
violence against both traditional nobles and officials from the popolo grosso, indicating that the
precise class of their opponents was to them less important than the fact that they, through wealth
and status, maintained a political authority lacked by the lower classes. On the next day, the
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revolutionary crowd gathered more members and plundered the Palace of the Podestà before
returning to the Palace of the Priors. Bruni implies that this crowd contained mainly, if not
entirely, members of the most humble class by specifically referring to them as the “mob”
without the plebs. The author of the Cronaca Prima reports that “they went to the Piazza della
Signoria, all armed, shouting ‘Viva il popolo minuto’” as they approached, underscoring this
notion.101 It must be recognized, however, that some of the humble workers from the Arte della
Lana were in fact “petty entrepreneurs, who were themselves employers of labor,” that these men
formed the leadership of the mob, and that they were socioeconomically closer to an artisan or
lesser guildsmen, though they did not enjoy the same political rights. 102 Upon reaching the
palace, “one Michele di Lando, wool comber,” appeared and “took in his hand for himself the
standard of justice…to save it for the popolo minuto.”103 Forcing themselves inside, the crowd
coerced the priors and Standard-bearer of Justice into abdicating their offices, allowed them to
return home (if they still had one), and began establishing members of their own as the city’s
governors.104
Michele di Lando was made Standard-bearer of Justice, and several men of both the
artisanal and humble classes, represented already in an above list, were appointed to executive
positions as priors, as district standard-bearers, or as members of the Twelve Good Men. While
they were deliberating, a sheriff arrived to propose to the popolo grosso, who were no longer in
charge, the hanging of the city’s poor men in retaliation to the day’s violence. He was
subsequently grabbed by the popolo minuto and torn to pieces, the smallest of which allegedly
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was not six ounces. 105 The new government issued many reforms that day, having begun by
burning the bags which contained the names of those eligible for political office under popolo
grosso rule and reforming the sortition process by which those names were chosen. 106 They
heard the complaints of those whom the Parte Guelfa had labeled Ghibellines in the recent
months, restored them to Guelph status, and judged that they would not be deemed enemies of
the state or of the Parte Guelfa.107 The anonymous chronicler writes that they did this to give
political participation to more people, “so that everyone would have part in the offices, and so
that all the citizens would be united together; and so that the poor person would have the part that
was proper to him. For they have always borne the costs, but the only ones to reap benefit have
been the rich.”108 They even attempted to eliminate the interest payments on investments in the
public debt from which the popolo grosso profited so greatly, though this was halted before it
came to fruition. 109
The reforms continued with the naming of a new leader for each major and minor guild.
Michele, the priors, and the new guild leaders then deliberated on the establishment of the “Arti
Minute,” (“the lowest guilds”) a group of guilds designed to afford the most humble workers
with some form of the political representation that they desired. 110 In total, the government
created three new guilds and enrolled 13,000 new men into guild membership. 111 The first of
these new guilds contained mainly dyers, silk weavers, and lesser craftsmen; the second
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contained a number of small, non-textile merchants as well as the wool shearers; and the third,
numbering about 9,000 men, contained the masses of wool carders and combers. 112 Because each
guild possessed the same amount of influence regardless of its population, the government in the
long run chose a disproportionately large number of minuti office holders from the “generally
more establishmentarian and smaller twenty-second and twenty-third guilds than from the
massive twenty-fourth,” meaning that the Ciompi still faced issues of political exclusion even
given their new guild. 113 Moreover, of the 13,000 newly-enfranchised men, fewer than 2,000
actually cleared the process of scrutiny required for holding office, implying that the new
government remained committed to excluding certain individuals just as the popolo grosso
government had done.114
The Lando government next turned its attention toward reforming the election process
itself, altering the law to state that the nine priors (including the gonfaloniere) should be chosen
as follows: three from the seven greater guilds, three from the fourteen lesser guilds, and three
from the three new minuti guilds.115 While this seems at first to be a fair policy or even one that
gives the minuti guilds a great share of representation, the subsequent altering of the scrutiny
process caused the policy to lose some of its efficacy. On August 9, Michele di Lando chose two
arrotti (confidants) to represent his views in the scrutiny process for choosing names to be drawn
in official elections. The priors also each chose one confidant, so each executive essentially
guaranteed himself a pair of eyes and ears in the process of choosing the city’s next leaders. 116
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Perhaps more than anything else, this process revealed the growing distance between the
entrepreneurs and lesser guildsmen of the Lando government and the popolo minuto, as the
confidants chosen were representative of the popolo grosso more than the commoners in any
form. The priors’ choices included a banker and a wool manufacturer/executive, among others,
and those of Lando himself included a doctor and a butcher.117 The first three of these were
established major guildsmen, while the fourth came from a lesser guild. Their cooperation with
the Lando government symbolized the creation of new alliances—between the major and lesser
guilds—that had begun during the Parte Guelfa’s period of labelling various individuals as
Ghibellines and that left the Ciompi and popolo minuto out of the political process. While the
original contingent that had overthrown the popolo grosso in July had been fairly representative
of the lower classes, the five-and-a-half week period in which the Lando government held power
highlighted just how sharp the social divide between guildsmen and non-guildsmen was, as
major guildsmen continued to receive official appointments. 118 Meanwhile, various uprisings
continued to cause violence throughout the city, and the Lando government began exiling
citizens who opposed them.119
This was the state of affairs in late August, when the Ciompi, who comprised the bulk of
the massive 24th guild, became fully conscious of what was happening to their supposed alliance
with the lesser guildsmen. Possibly named after the sound made when their wooden clogs struck
the street, the Ciompi helped bring the number of guildsmen in the city up to 22,000 in a
population of 55,000 men and women, implying that a great majority of Florentine men held
guild membership in the summer of 1378. 120 These new men did not take their newfound
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positions lightly and attempted to be actively involved in the city’s political processes. But, as
we have seen with the priors’ selection of confidants, the Lando government was beginning to
reverse its loyalties from the popolo minuto to the popolo grosso. Another sign of this
phenomenon appeared on August 21st, when the scrutiners, having finished vetting the new
candidates for office in the upcoming elections, formed among themselves a consortery, or
“brotherhood.” The consortery granted them what in Florence was called “pre-eminence,” which
allowed them to enjoy banquets, to bear “offensive and defensive arms,” and to create their own
standard.121 The particular standard that they created was characterized by “a gold lion on a blue
field, the lion holding the cross of the popolo di Firenze in its claw and wearing a shield with the
word ‘Liberty’ on its breast,” thus being a physical representation of the popolo grosso’s alliance
with this body of government.122 Because the Lando government had direct ties to the body of
scrutiners through their confidants, they could expect to be included in the consortery and to
enjoy pre-eminence even after leaving office on September 1st. The popolo minuto noticed the
alliance when the consortery held a lavish banquet at the church of Ognissanti a few days later,
and they grew concerned that the new government was becoming increasingly closed to them. 123
Not to be outdone, the Ciompi picked a standard for themselves to rally behind, choosing
a neighborhood flag adorned with an angel. 124 Each of the now twenty-four Florentine guilds
possessed a standard, and each proudly displayed it when the guilds convened for elections on
August 29th in the Piazza della Signoria. When the elections were completed, all of the guilds
exited the square with their flags except the Ciompi, who remained in protest.125 Their newfound
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solidarity angered the major guildsmen of the popolo grosso, who formulated a conspiracy with
their allies in the Lando government to do away with the 24th guild and return its members to the
status of the wool guild’s property. 126 On the next day, two or three members of the Eight Saints,
now faithfully aiding the popolo minuto who had backed them during the Parte Guelfa’s
accusations two months ago, approached the Palace of the Priors “to demand the oath of the
outgoing and incoming governments not to pass any legislation without their approval.” 127
Michele di Lando subsequently ordered that they be taken prisoner, and rumors abounded that
the popolo minuto were poised to commit more burnings in retaliation.128
On the morning of August 31st, Lando himself, on his last day in office, mounted his
horse and rode through the city allegedly with the intent of arresting the remaining members of
the Eight Saints. Some of the popolo minuto had amassed in the square before the Palace of the
Priors to demand the return of the imprisoned Saints, but they listened to the city’s leader when
he emerged. He carried with him the standard of justice, and he and his entourage shouted,
“`Long live the people and the guilds, and may he who desires a lord die,’ claiming that the Eight
Saints wanted a lord (to rule them).” 129 Thus, the guildsmen’s conspiracy was revealed—to
convince the populace that the members of the Eight Saints were attempting to sell Florence and
to replace its republican traditions with the type of lordship found in Milan and other duchies.
Lando’s government had now fully switched sides, as where it had once sided with the Eight
Saints and fought with popolo minuto against the Parte Guelfa and the previous popolo grosso
government, it now had an established alliance with the major guildsmen of the popolo grosso
and actively opposed the minuto’s interests. Lando believed that this conspiracy could end the
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city’s rampant social conflicts by deceiving the Ciompi into believing that their Eight Saints
were in fact traitors, thus bringing them in line obediently with the new alliance of guilds. His
carrying of the standard of justice was crucial to this, as the people knew to always follow and
obey the Standard-bearer of Justice when he carried his flag with him. 130 Lando deceived these
members of the minuto, for as he led them out of the square, guildsmen filed in to occupy it so
that the minuto would not be able to return.131
But many of the radical Ciompi were not among those led away by Lando, and they
approached the piazza filled with guildsmen and demanded entry. 132 They gathered under their
flag of the angel, and when the priors requested that all guilds give up their flags and display
them from the governmental palace’s windows, they realized that the government’s true aim was
to force them into disorganization. When they demanded a new flag to rally under, the
government refused, and a brief but violent battle ensued in the square. 133 Michele di Lando, now
having returned from leading away the original party of the minuto, joined his guildsmen in
driving the Ciompi from the square, a struggle in which many Ciompi perished. 134 The
guildsmen’s assault was led by members of the butchers’ guild, perhaps symbolic of the
devastation wrought upon the Ciompi that day. The new alliance had triumphed, and the Ciompi
were left powerless again. On September 1, the government determined to cleanse itself of any
members from the 24th guild who still remained, and the guild itself was formally abolished
shortly after.135
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The lesser guildsmen, however, had gained a significant political position through their
shrewd dealings in the last month, which they retained until 1382. The flag of the Parte Guelfa
was permitted to re-enter to the city in 1381 and even received a parade upon its return,
indicating that the traditional nobility were no longer entirely ostracized. 136 The government
reversed the status of those nobles who had been labeled magnates in 1382, and those whom the
government had exiled since Salvestro de’Medici’s tenure as Standard-bearer of Justice were
permitted to return as well, for his was the most recent government which the popolo grosso
deemed not excessively radical. The remaining two guilds of the popolo minuto were also
disbanded so that only the original twenty-one remained. 137 Many of the men who had been in
power during the past four years were banished or made public enemies, and the former exiles
began reforming their government alongside the popolo grosso. Bruni reports violence in
response, but only mentions “frequent outbreaks,” and that the city was eventually “freed of its
troubles.” The exiles received their old properties and offices, and the city “recovered order and
stability.”138 The period in Florence’s history known as the “Ciompi Revolt,” had formally ended
with the pre-1378 situation largely restored. Over the next several decades, the popolo grosso
enjoyed the most power that it would ever hold while maintaining its alliance with the Parte
Guelfa, until one family, the Medici, emerged to establish its dominance in the 1430s.

Conclusions
If the popolo grosso themselves were the “new men” of the Florence when they began
taking over the noble government a little over a century before the revolts of 1378, their
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sympathies toward other new men had evaporated by the time of the Black Death. Their
treatment of and resentment toward the Ciompi and the other peasants who migrated to Florence
for work and better opportunities reveals how callous and detached the major guildsmen grew in
their affluence. Mired in poverty and systematically excluded from the processes by which they
could alleviate their situation, the new men of the post-plague period expressed their frustrations
with the societal divide in the most noticeable way possible: open rebellion against the
government perceived as the source of the problem. At their core, the experiences of the
revolutionaries of 1378 speak to the dangers of allowing issues of urban poverty to go
unaddressed, with violent action becoming a viable option for those whose situations turn
desperate enough. But they also challenge the traditional narrative of Renaissance
historiography, which promotes the Italy of this period as a movement away from the feudal
institutions of the Middle Ages and toward something more modern. The collective experience
of these new men as disenfranchised hopefuls, manual laborers, and the legal property of their
employers suggests that the urban society of Renaissance Florence did not break with the social
traditions of the preceding several centuries, but rather transformed them by creating a continuity
in the form of a new “urban-based serfdom” that left its participants in a similar, nearly
propertyless state.
With the adage that “absolute power corrupts absolutely” firmly implanted in our
memories, the Ciompi Revolt offers the notion that even a smaller amount of shared power can
corrupt an individual thoroughly. Michele di Lando’s betrayal of the popolo minuto represents
the effect that promises of prestige and greater influence can have on one who previously did not
know these benefits. He not only discarded those members of the minuto, who had initially aided
the lesser guildsmen in the July Revolution, and replaced them with the popolo grosso, he
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actively participated in their violent demise alongside his new allies. His shift in allegiances
suggests that participation in a tainted system has the potential to corrupt those who enter with
seemingly honest intention. But if even increased representation for the classes who need and
desire it most can backfire and result in further tragedy, how can such a situation be resolved,
and how can a more equitable experience be shared by citizens of various backgrounds? Bruni
suggests,
“This state of affairs can stand as an eternal example and warning for the city’s
leading citizens that they should not allow civil unrest and armed force to come
down to the whims of the mob. For it cannot be restrained once it begins to snatch
the reins and realizes that it is more powerful, being more numerous. Most of all,
it seems, one should beware of seditious actions which have their origins among
the principal citizens, for they end up moving from there to the lower orders.”139
What Bruni means by “seditious actions” is undoubtedly the Law of Admonition that
created the dissension among the upper classes and provided the lesser ones with an
opportunity to seize power. However, if a modern interpreter were to construe these
“seditious actions” as the perpetuation of wealth and representation inequality over a
prolonged period of time (an offense against any government which claims republicanism
as its foundation), then Bruni’s claim might present a more valid hypothesis.
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